01
Abstract
In one sentence
Preflight is a pre-click safety gate for Web3: hand a suspicious link, repository or file to an isolated cloud environment first, then decide whether to open it on your own machine.
Traditional antivirus and EDR alert after a file lands or executes. Web3 professionals lose funds in the second they "just click": a fake recruiting assignment, a malicious GitHub repository, a cracked tool, a second-stage downloader. Preflight moves the decision to T-1: the server fetches the sample, unpacks it, runs static and dynamic analysis against Web3-specific indicators and returns an actionable conclusion — do not open / isolated machine only / low risk but stay careful.
This whitepaper is a project draft. It covers the threat model, detection indicators, architecture, MVP scope and the promises we explicitly do not make, and is updated as the implementation progresses.
02
Background
Attacks on exchanges and Web3 teams have shifted from on-chain contract bugs to people and developer machines. Public post-mortems share the same paths: malicious coding assignments delivered through fake interviews, poisoned developer tooling, an engineer's laptop compromised and used to pivot into wallet infrastructure. In parallel, retail users and operations staff keep running into phishing domains, clippers (clipboard address swapping), malicious browser extensions and unlimited-approval scams.
Existing defences have a timing gap. Local antivirus engages fully only after download or execution. Browser blocklists depend on known bad domains and miss fresh redirects and malicious assignments hosted on legitimate platforms. Generic sandbox reports speak in malware family names and never answer the Web3 question: will it steal MetaMask, will it swap my withdrawal address.
The gap
Users do not need another post-landing scanner. They need a verdict before the click.
03
Positioning
- Category
- Web3 pre-click / pre-download safety gate
- Not
- a general antivirus replacement, an on-chain contract audit platform, an exchange-grade SOC
- Core action
- paste a link / upload a sample → isolated analysis → risk verdict → then decide whether to open locally
- Success
- a measurable drop in casual clicks; high recall on known families and typical Web3 credential theft
- Explicitly not promised
- catching 100 % of 0-days; replacing hardware wallets and privilege isolation
Tagline: drop the link in first, then decide whether to click.
04
Target users
| Group | Value | Typical scenario |
|---|---|---|
| Exchange / wallet / infrastructure engineers | High value | Interview assignments, internal tools, dependency installs, scripts and container images |
| Web3 operations & community managers | High frequency | Unknown links in TG / Discord, airdrop pages, "toolkits" sent by partners |
| Traders & treasury operators | High frequency | Desktop indicators, cracked plugins, unofficial clients, withdrawal-related files |
| Startups & individual builders | Scale | npm / PyPI packages, Chrome extensions, open-source repositories, document attachments |
05
Threat model
Preflight prioritises initial access and credential theft that begin with a user opening external content — not end-to-end APT forensics after an intrusion.
| Threat | Typical lure | Web3 consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Fake recruiting / Contagious Interview | Coding-assignment Git repo, setup script | Developer machine compromised → wallet / CI credentials |
| Supply-chain poisoning | Malicious npm / Homebrew / Terraform provider | Executes on install, steals keys |
| Phishing domains & redirects | Lookalike sites, short links, HTML smuggling | Wallet connect / seed import |
| Clipper | Cracked apps, bundled installers | Copied address silently replaced |
| Extension poisoning | "Security helper" .crx files | Reads extension wallets, CDP hijack |
| Documents / installers | dmg / pkg / exe, macro documents | RAT / stealer lands |
| Session & overlay | Injection into logged-in exchange pages | Fake 2FA, silent withdrawal |
06
Detection indicators
Indicators are ordered by how funds are lost. Reports speak to users in "will I lose coins" terms and keep IOCs and the evidence chain for analysts.
A. Entry & disguise
- Install chains demanded by the README: npm i, terraform init, curl | bash, run the installer
- Identity disguise: double extensions, forged code signatures, borrowed IDE / Homebrew / updater names
- Second-stage pulls from GitHub, Vercel, Telegram or file lockers
- Weaponised documents: macros, OLE, external links, HTML smuggling
B. Crypto-specific behaviour (the core)
| Category | Signals | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Wallet & key harvesting | Reads keystore / wallet.dat / Electrum / Exodus; scans MetaMask-style extension directories and fixed extension IDs; seed-word regexes; .env / PEM / SSH | Critical |
| Browser session theft | Reads cookies / LocalStorage, decrypts Chromium keys, injects into logged-in exchanges, fake withdrawal overlays | Critical |
| Clipper | Polls the clipboard; matches 0x / bc1 / Solana base58; writes back an attacker address | High |
| Signature & approval lures | eth_requestAccounts, unlimited approve, setApprovalForAll, Permit2, malicious EIP-712 / EIP-7702 logic | High |
| Extension poisoning | Broad permissions, chrome.debugger, all-sites content scripts, unofficial update URL, altered wallet-extension permissions | High |
| Supply chain | postinstall / preinstall, odd registries, replaced local CLIs, malicious providers, cracked trading plugins | High |
C. Generic malice that travels with crypto malware
- Persistence: LaunchAgents, Run keys, scheduled tasks, browser hijacks
- Evasion: sandbox / VM / debugger kills, quarantine removal, codesign -s -, process injection
- C2: Telegram bots, GitHub API as a channel, odd DNS / DoH, short-lived domains
- Other: mining, keylogging, screenshots, packaged credential exfiltration
D. User-facing scorecard
| Dimension | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Seed / private-key theft | Searches for or exfiltrates mnemonics and key material |
| Browser-wallet risk | Touches wallet-extension data |
| Clipper risk | Monitors and rewrites wallet addresses |
| Exchange session hijack | Steals sessions or forges withdrawal UI |
| Supply-chain install | Install scripts / dependencies hide execution |
| Persistence & evasion | Stays resident, cleans traces, resists analysis |
| Overall | Safe / Suspicious / High risk · with evidence and actions |
07
Architecture
- 01
Input
link / file / repository
- 02
Access layer
auth · quota · upload isolation
- 03
Safe fetch
server-side pull · redirect resolution · object storage
- 04
Static analysis
YARA · manifests · strings · dependency graph
- 05
Isolated dynamic analysis
one environment per sample · controlled egress · destroyed afterwards
- 06
Intelligence
phishing lists · domains · IOCs
- 07
AI explanation
evidence → plain Web3 language
- 08
Report
scorecard · evidence chain · IOCs
Principles
Every sample is presumed hostile. Analysis environments are network-isolated from the control plane. Dynamic analysis disks are destroyed afterwards. User keys and user machines never enter the analysis logic.
08
Pipeline
- 1
Submit
Paste a link or upload a file; optional context ("interview task", "tool from TG") adjusts detection weights.
- 2
Safe fetch & normalisation
Server follows redirects with a cap, verifies MIME and magic bytes, unpacks nested archives, deduplicates by hash.
- 3
Static pre-check
Hash intelligence, YARA, script and lockfile audit, extension manifest permission scoring, entropy and obfuscation features.
- 4
Isolated execution
Windows / macOS / Linux sandboxes by type; monitors wallet paths, clipboard, process tree, DNS / HTTPS.
- 5
Web3 rule engine
Maps behaviour onto scorecard dimensions; a lethal hit short-circuits to High risk.
- 6
AI summary
Conclusion and actions generated only from collected evidence; no evidence-free speculation.
- 7
Deliver
Web report + copyable IOCs; enterprise webhook / Slack; samples never return to the user's machine.
09
Role and limits of AI
What AI does
- Translates technical evidence into Web3 consequences: access to the MetaMask extension directory → you may lose your browser wallet
- Fuses signals: static hits + dynamic behaviour + list results → one scorecard
- Recommends the next action: do not click, switch to an isolated machine, open only on a hardware-wallet machine
What AI does not do
- It does not replace the sandbox: truth about behaviour comes from execution and rules, not from a model "feeling" danger
- It does not promise to recognise every 0-day: adversarial samples may evade execution; the copy must stay honest
- It never touches user keys: the check requires no wallet connection and collects no seed words
10
How it differs
| Approach | Strength | Gap | Preflight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local antivirus / EDR | Post-landing detection, endpoint residency | Usually after the click or execution | T-1 decision |
| VirusTotal-style | Multi-engine static scanning | Weak Web3 semantics, weak repo install chains | Crypto scorecard + assignment-repo scenario |
| Phishing lists | Fast on known bad domains | New redirects, malicious tasks on legitimate hosts | Behaviour analysis after fetching |
| Wallet simulation extensions | Asset changes before signing | Ignores downloaders and interview tasks | Complements at the file / link entry |
| Contract-audit AI | On-chain code | Ignores the office-machine entry | Different track; a partner, not a replacement |
11
MVP & roadmap
| Stage | Scope | Goal | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| MVP-0 | Static pre-check of URLs / repositories / packages + public phishing lists + domain intelligence + AI report (zh / en) | Close the pre-click loop | Current release (this site) |
| MVP-1 | File upload + Linux / Windows container sandbox + hash / YARA + Web3 path & clipboard rules | Validate the dynamic loop | Next phase |
| MVP-2 | Deep pre-check of Git repositories and npm install chains (fake-interview scenario) | Match recent large-case lures | Planned |
| MVP-3 | Chrome extension .crx static analysis (permissions / CDP / update source) | Ops and "security plugin" lures | Planned |
| MVP-4 | macOS sandbox (pkg / dmg, LaunchAgent, Keychain access) | Engineers' primary machines | Planned |
| Growth | Enterprise SSO, private deployment, Slack / TG bot, appeals and a sample alliance | B2B expansion | Planned |
Status is updated on this page as the implementation progresses.
12
Security, compliance & abuse
1. Samples are hostile by default
- Per-tenant environments, destroyed after analysis, isolated from the control plane
- Egress allowlist (intelligence and required CDNs) so the sandbox cannot become a bot
2. Abuse & legal
- Rate limits, malicious-upload circuit breakers, no use of the site as a malware relay
- Audit logs retained; data residency optional for enterprise
3. Privacy
- The check requires no wallet connection or seed words; connecting a wallet only shows holdings and unlocks quota, and the sign-in signature grants no permission over funds
- Reports can be shared anonymously at hash level; raw samples are never public by default
4. Disclaimer
- Pre-checks reduce risk; they do not guarantee safety
- High-value operations still belong on hardware wallets and dedicated machines
13
Token & quota
The Preflight token is the utility layer of this site on BNB Chain, not a gate: anonymous checks stay free (a limited number per day). The token launches on flap; this page and the token page update as soon as the contract address is public.
- Hold for quota
- Daily check tiers by wallet holdings; active after connecting and signing in, reset at 00:00 UTC
- Burn for priority
- Send tokens to the dead address; every full unit adds one permanent check credit. Once the sandbox is live, burns also buy queue priority and deeper analysis
- Verification
- The server reads the Transfer(wallet → dead) event from the transaction receipt and credits only the event's from address — no contract interaction, no approvals
- What it never does
- No custody, no approvals, no signing on your behalf; the token never changes a verdict
14
Business model (draft)
| Tier | Contents | Goal |
|---|---|---|
| Free | Limited link / file checks, educational reports, builds the "drop first, click later" habit | Acquisition |
| Pro | Higher quota, repository / npm / extension checks, report history, priority queue | Individuals / small teams |
| Team / Enterprise | SSO, private or dedicated clusters, API, Slack / TG bots, SLA, custom rules | Exchanges and wallet companies |
| Intelligence sharing (optional) | Users contribute hashes and bad domains under consent, feeding the lists (strict compliance) | Network effect |
15
Risks & non-goals
Must be part of every public narrative
Preflight cannot promise to stop every 0-day and does not replace local EDR, hardware wallets or least-privilege discipline.
- Evasion: samples may detect the sandbox; diverse environments and delayed execution are needed, and limits must be disclosed honestly
- False positives hurt trust: legitimate installers also touch sensitive APIs; verdicts must be graded and appealable
- Cost: one environment per sample is expensive; queues, caching (same hash answers instantly) and graded depth
- Non-goals: no formal verification of contracts, no fund recovery, no replacement for social-engineering training
16
Conclusion
A large part of Web3 security's next battlefield is the moment before the click. Preflight's value is turning isolated analysis and crypto-specific indicators into a gate anyone can use before opening a link.
Next: build the MVP-1 fetcher and Windows / Linux sandboxes → measure recall on public stealers / clippers and simulated interview repositories → open a small private beta.
Not sure about that link? Don't open it yet.
Paste it into Preflight first. Three free checks a day, no account, no wallet.