Documentation

Whitepaper

Preflight · Web3 pre-click safety check. Draft v0.1 — the product name and parameters may still change; this page is updated as the implementation progresses.

Draft v0.1 · updated 2026-11-05

01

Abstract

In one sentence

Preflight is a pre-click safety gate for Web3: hand a suspicious link, repository or file to an isolated cloud environment first, then decide whether to open it on your own machine.

Traditional antivirus and EDR alert after a file lands or executes. Web3 professionals lose funds in the second they "just click": a fake recruiting assignment, a malicious GitHub repository, a cracked tool, a second-stage downloader. Preflight moves the decision to T-1: the server fetches the sample, unpacks it, runs static and dynamic analysis against Web3-specific indicators and returns an actionable conclusion — do not open / isolated machine only / low risk but stay careful.

This whitepaper is a project draft. It covers the threat model, detection indicators, architecture, MVP scope and the promises we explicitly do not make, and is updated as the implementation progresses.

02

Background

Attacks on exchanges and Web3 teams have shifted from on-chain contract bugs to people and developer machines. Public post-mortems share the same paths: malicious coding assignments delivered through fake interviews, poisoned developer tooling, an engineer's laptop compromised and used to pivot into wallet infrastructure. In parallel, retail users and operations staff keep running into phishing domains, clippers (clipboard address swapping), malicious browser extensions and unlimited-approval scams.

Existing defences have a timing gap. Local antivirus engages fully only after download or execution. Browser blocklists depend on known bad domains and miss fresh redirects and malicious assignments hosted on legitimate platforms. Generic sandbox reports speak in malware family names and never answer the Web3 question: will it steal MetaMask, will it swap my withdrawal address.

The gap

Users do not need another post-landing scanner. They need a verdict before the click.

03

Positioning

Category
Web3 pre-click / pre-download safety gate
Not
a general antivirus replacement, an on-chain contract audit platform, an exchange-grade SOC
Core action
paste a link / upload a sample → isolated analysis → risk verdict → then decide whether to open locally
Success
a measurable drop in casual clicks; high recall on known families and typical Web3 credential theft
Explicitly not promised
catching 100 % of 0-days; replacing hardware wallets and privilege isolation

Tagline: drop the link in first, then decide whether to click.

04

Target users

GroupValueTypical scenario
Exchange / wallet / infrastructure engineersHigh valueInterview assignments, internal tools, dependency installs, scripts and container images
Web3 operations & community managersHigh frequencyUnknown links in TG / Discord, airdrop pages, "toolkits" sent by partners
Traders & treasury operatorsHigh frequencyDesktop indicators, cracked plugins, unofficial clients, withdrawal-related files
Startups & individual buildersScalenpm / PyPI packages, Chrome extensions, open-source repositories, document attachments

05

Threat model

Preflight prioritises initial access and credential theft that begin with a user opening external content — not end-to-end APT forensics after an intrusion.

ThreatTypical lureWeb3 consequence
Fake recruiting / Contagious InterviewCoding-assignment Git repo, setup scriptDeveloper machine compromised → wallet / CI credentials
Supply-chain poisoningMalicious npm / Homebrew / Terraform providerExecutes on install, steals keys
Phishing domains & redirectsLookalike sites, short links, HTML smugglingWallet connect / seed import
ClipperCracked apps, bundled installersCopied address silently replaced
Extension poisoning"Security helper" .crx filesReads extension wallets, CDP hijack
Documents / installersdmg / pkg / exe, macro documentsRAT / stealer lands
Session & overlayInjection into logged-in exchange pagesFake 2FA, silent withdrawal

06

Detection indicators

Indicators are ordered by how funds are lost. Reports speak to users in "will I lose coins" terms and keep IOCs and the evidence chain for analysts.

A. Entry & disguise

  • Install chains demanded by the README: npm i, terraform init, curl | bash, run the installer
  • Identity disguise: double extensions, forged code signatures, borrowed IDE / Homebrew / updater names
  • Second-stage pulls from GitHub, Vercel, Telegram or file lockers
  • Weaponised documents: macros, OLE, external links, HTML smuggling

B. Crypto-specific behaviour (the core)

CategorySignalsSeverity
Wallet & key harvestingReads keystore / wallet.dat / Electrum / Exodus; scans MetaMask-style extension directories and fixed extension IDs; seed-word regexes; .env / PEM / SSHCritical
Browser session theftReads cookies / LocalStorage, decrypts Chromium keys, injects into logged-in exchanges, fake withdrawal overlaysCritical
ClipperPolls the clipboard; matches 0x / bc1 / Solana base58; writes back an attacker addressHigh
Signature & approval lureseth_requestAccounts, unlimited approve, setApprovalForAll, Permit2, malicious EIP-712 / EIP-7702 logicHigh
Extension poisoningBroad permissions, chrome.debugger, all-sites content scripts, unofficial update URL, altered wallet-extension permissionsHigh
Supply chainpostinstall / preinstall, odd registries, replaced local CLIs, malicious providers, cracked trading pluginsHigh

C. Generic malice that travels with crypto malware

  • Persistence: LaunchAgents, Run keys, scheduled tasks, browser hijacks
  • Evasion: sandbox / VM / debugger kills, quarantine removal, codesign -s -, process injection
  • C2: Telegram bots, GitHub API as a channel, odd DNS / DoH, short-lived domains
  • Other: mining, keylogging, screenshots, packaged credential exfiltration

D. User-facing scorecard

DimensionMeaning
Seed / private-key theftSearches for or exfiltrates mnemonics and key material
Browser-wallet riskTouches wallet-extension data
Clipper riskMonitors and rewrites wallet addresses
Exchange session hijackSteals sessions or forges withdrawal UI
Supply-chain installInstall scripts / dependencies hide execution
Persistence & evasionStays resident, cleans traces, resists analysis
OverallSafe / Suspicious / High risk · with evidence and actions

07

Architecture

  1. 01

    Input

    link / file / repository

  2. 02

    Access layer

    auth · quota · upload isolation

  3. 03

    Safe fetch

    server-side pull · redirect resolution · object storage

  4. 04

    Static analysis

    YARA · manifests · strings · dependency graph

  5. 05

    Isolated dynamic analysis

    one environment per sample · controlled egress · destroyed afterwards

  6. 06

    Intelligence

    phishing lists · domains · IOCs

  7. 07

    AI explanation

    evidence → plain Web3 language

  8. 08

    Report

    scorecard · evidence chain · IOCs

Principles

Every sample is presumed hostile. Analysis environments are network-isolated from the control plane. Dynamic analysis disks are destroyed afterwards. User keys and user machines never enter the analysis logic.

08

Pipeline

  1. 1

    Submit

    Paste a link or upload a file; optional context ("interview task", "tool from TG") adjusts detection weights.

  2. 2

    Safe fetch & normalisation

    Server follows redirects with a cap, verifies MIME and magic bytes, unpacks nested archives, deduplicates by hash.

  3. 3

    Static pre-check

    Hash intelligence, YARA, script and lockfile audit, extension manifest permission scoring, entropy and obfuscation features.

  4. 4

    Isolated execution

    Windows / macOS / Linux sandboxes by type; monitors wallet paths, clipboard, process tree, DNS / HTTPS.

  5. 5

    Web3 rule engine

    Maps behaviour onto scorecard dimensions; a lethal hit short-circuits to High risk.

  6. 6

    AI summary

    Conclusion and actions generated only from collected evidence; no evidence-free speculation.

  7. 7

    Deliver

    Web report + copyable IOCs; enterprise webhook / Slack; samples never return to the user's machine.

09

Role and limits of AI

What AI does

  • Translates technical evidence into Web3 consequences: access to the MetaMask extension directory → you may lose your browser wallet
  • Fuses signals: static hits + dynamic behaviour + list results → one scorecard
  • Recommends the next action: do not click, switch to an isolated machine, open only on a hardware-wallet machine

What AI does not do

  • It does not replace the sandbox: truth about behaviour comes from execution and rules, not from a model "feeling" danger
  • It does not promise to recognise every 0-day: adversarial samples may evade execution; the copy must stay honest
  • It never touches user keys: the check requires no wallet connection and collects no seed words

10

How it differs

ApproachStrengthGapPreflight
Local antivirus / EDRPost-landing detection, endpoint residencyUsually after the click or executionT-1 decision
VirusTotal-styleMulti-engine static scanningWeak Web3 semantics, weak repo install chainsCrypto scorecard + assignment-repo scenario
Phishing listsFast on known bad domainsNew redirects, malicious tasks on legitimate hostsBehaviour analysis after fetching
Wallet simulation extensionsAsset changes before signingIgnores downloaders and interview tasksComplements at the file / link entry
Contract-audit AIOn-chain codeIgnores the office-machine entryDifferent track; a partner, not a replacement

11

MVP & roadmap

StageScopeGoalStatus
MVP-0Static pre-check of URLs / repositories / packages + public phishing lists + domain intelligence + AI report (zh / en)Close the pre-click loopCurrent release (this site)
MVP-1File upload + Linux / Windows container sandbox + hash / YARA + Web3 path & clipboard rulesValidate the dynamic loopNext phase
MVP-2Deep pre-check of Git repositories and npm install chains (fake-interview scenario)Match recent large-case luresPlanned
MVP-3Chrome extension .crx static analysis (permissions / CDP / update source)Ops and "security plugin" luresPlanned
MVP-4macOS sandbox (pkg / dmg, LaunchAgent, Keychain access)Engineers' primary machinesPlanned
GrowthEnterprise SSO, private deployment, Slack / TG bot, appeals and a sample allianceB2B expansionPlanned

Status is updated on this page as the implementation progresses.

12

Security, compliance & abuse

1. Samples are hostile by default

  • Per-tenant environments, destroyed after analysis, isolated from the control plane
  • Egress allowlist (intelligence and required CDNs) so the sandbox cannot become a bot

2. Abuse & legal

  • Rate limits, malicious-upload circuit breakers, no use of the site as a malware relay
  • Audit logs retained; data residency optional for enterprise

3. Privacy

  • The check requires no wallet connection or seed words; connecting a wallet only shows holdings and unlocks quota, and the sign-in signature grants no permission over funds
  • Reports can be shared anonymously at hash level; raw samples are never public by default

4. Disclaimer

  • Pre-checks reduce risk; they do not guarantee safety
  • High-value operations still belong on hardware wallets and dedicated machines

13

Token & quota

The Preflight token is the utility layer of this site on BNB Chain, not a gate: anonymous checks stay free (a limited number per day). The token launches on flap; this page and the token page update as soon as the contract address is public.

Hold for quota
Daily check tiers by wallet holdings; active after connecting and signing in, reset at 00:00 UTC
Burn for priority
Send tokens to the dead address; every full unit adds one permanent check credit. Once the sandbox is live, burns also buy queue priority and deeper analysis
Verification
The server reads the Transfer(wallet → dead) event from the transaction receipt and credits only the event's from address — no contract interaction, no approvals
What it never does
No custody, no approvals, no signing on your behalf; the token never changes a verdict

14

Business model (draft)

TierContentsGoal
FreeLimited link / file checks, educational reports, builds the "drop first, click later" habitAcquisition
ProHigher quota, repository / npm / extension checks, report history, priority queueIndividuals / small teams
Team / EnterpriseSSO, private or dedicated clusters, API, Slack / TG bots, SLA, custom rulesExchanges and wallet companies
Intelligence sharing (optional)Users contribute hashes and bad domains under consent, feeding the lists (strict compliance)Network effect

15

Risks & non-goals

Must be part of every public narrative

Preflight cannot promise to stop every 0-day and does not replace local EDR, hardware wallets or least-privilege discipline.

  • Evasion: samples may detect the sandbox; diverse environments and delayed execution are needed, and limits must be disclosed honestly
  • False positives hurt trust: legitimate installers also touch sensitive APIs; verdicts must be graded and appealable
  • Cost: one environment per sample is expensive; queues, caching (same hash answers instantly) and graded depth
  • Non-goals: no formal verification of contracts, no fund recovery, no replacement for social-engineering training

16

Conclusion

A large part of Web3 security's next battlefield is the moment before the click. Preflight's value is turning isolated analysis and crypto-specific indicators into a gate anyone can use before opening a link.

Next: build the MVP-1 fetcher and Windows / Linux sandboxes → measure recall on public stealers / clippers and simulated interview repositories → open a small private beta.

Not sure about that link? Don't open it yet.

Paste it into Preflight first. Three free checks a day, no account, no wallet.

Check a link